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Review of The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the 
French Revolution, by Francis Fukuyama. New York: Farrar, Straus, 
and Giroux, 2011.
I
 In The Origins of Political Order, Francis Fukuyama provides a lucid 
historical account of the development of political order in human societies, 
from a strongly synthetic perspective. The bulk of nearly 600 pages repre-
sents only a half of his project. A second volume will deal with the period 
from the nineteenth century, in which, Fukuyama claims, conditions for the 
formation of human political institutions have undergone fundamental 
changes. As indicated repeatedly, this book was inspired by Samuel 
Huntington’s 1968 work Political Order in Changing Societies, which 
Fukuyama believes must be supplemented with a historical investigation of 
how the modern polity developed. (Huntington’s analysis of the problems 
faced by contemporary developing countries in modernizing their political 
systems, according to Fukuyama, takes for granted the existence and exem-
plary role of such institutions as the state and political parties.) By this inves-
tigation, Fukuyama expects to reveal the historical contingencies of state 
formation in different societies and to examine in a historical light the causes 
of diverse failed attempts to build a modern state.
 At this point Fukuyama’s philosophy of political development becomes 
apparent. He lays particular emphasis on the idea of contingency, mainly to 
ward off accusations of historical teleology concerning the emergence of, or 
global convergence toward, the modern Western political establishment. 
However, he also argues that once the three key institutions—the state, the 
rule of law, and government accountability—took shape, fortuitously 
combined together, and stood the test of time, they became imitable and 
indeed desirable for non-Western nations, although the degree of success in 
transplanting institutions is, again, historically conditioned. Thus, in this 
ambitious work, history assumes a strategic character. To wit, resorting to 
historical circumstances endows the narrative of the development of the 
political order with complexity. Nonetheless, replacing a linear view of 
history with a circumstantial, contingent one does not assume historical rela-
tivity. Theoretically, Fukuyama regards a well-balanced combination of these 
three institutional factors to be the key to sustainable political success, as well 
as a guarantee of both state power and social welfare. Indeed, at the end of 
this volume, Fukuyama attributes the chronic dysfunction of democracy in the 
United States, the European Union, Japan, and India to different degrees of 
mutual alienation among the state, the rule of law, and accountable govern-
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ment. According to Fukuyama, this historical investigation serves to recon-
firm the superiority of these institutions emerging out of contingencies, even 
though their necessity and rationality in an even larger historical perspective 
is not obviously in question. Little wonder that this standpoint, ahistorical to 
a certain degree, reminds some reviewers of Fukuyama’s Western-centric, 
end-of-history conceit, revealed in his previous works. The author’s erudition 
and organizing power warrant a thorough reading of this thought-provoking 
book, yet its historical argument needs a critical review from the stance of 
historical studies in general and historical thinking in particular.
II
 “The purpose of this book is less to present a history of political develop-
ment than to analyze some of the factors that led to the emergence of certain 
key political institutions” (p. 22). “What I am aiming for in this book is a 
middle-range theory that avoids the pitfalls both of excessive abstraction (the 
vice of economists) and excessive particularism (the problem of many histo-
rians and anthropologists). I am hoping to recover something of the lost 
tradition of nineteenth-century historical sociology or comparative anthro-
pology” (p. 24). These statements well specify the purpose and methodology 
of the project, in which Fukuyama takes on a nineteenth-century style of 
grand narrative that does not shy away from extensive comparisons and 
generalizations.
 To begin with, Fukuyama supports the inevitability of the development 
of the human political order on biological grounds. Part 1 of the book, 
“Before the State,” expounds on the necessity of politics and the formation of 
early human political organizations. After a broad survey of works on 
biology, psychology, and anthropology, Fukuyama comes to the conclusion 
that group orientation, construction of a mental model of causality, rule 
following driven more by emotion than by reason, and the desire for recogni-
tion constitute natural building blocks for us to construct a theory of political 
development. On this basis he sets out to delineate the four successive stages 
of political development: “For bands and tribes, social organization is based 
on kinship, and these societies are relatively egalitarian. Chiefdoms and states, 
by contrast, are organized hierarchically and exert authority on a territorial 
rather than a kinship basis” (p. 53). Evidence shows that the four types of 
human society can coexist, but the direction of evolution is unmistakable. 
Kinship organizations are an outgrowth of human nature, Fukuyama argues, 
since one of its biological building blocks, group orientation, promotes kin 
selection and reciprocal altruism. Though tribes are complex in nature, their 
decentralized structure and lack of clear rules of succession impose limita-
tions on the solidification and expansion of tribal societies. Fukuyama does 
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not really discuss the structure of chiefdoms, but the crucial step out of the 
tribal stage is the effort of political agents to detach themselves from kinship 
influence and favor functionality. Here we enter the domain of impersonal 
political mechanisms that seek to maximize efficacy in the group’s deal-
ings—an achievement that heralds the birth of the first key institution of the 
modern political order, the state.
 Fukuyama challenges the notion of Western centrism not only by arguing 
that modern political institutions arose from historical contingencies without 
foreshadowing the inevitable rise of the West, but also by claiming that China 
had the first organized state. Following Max Weber’s definition of the state as 
“an organization deploying a legitimate monopoly of violence over a defined 
territory” and Weber’s criteria for modern states as “subject to a rational divi-
sion of labor, based on technical specialization and expertise, and impersonal 
both with regard to recruitment and their authority over citizens,” Fukuyama 
finds the first appearance of mature state apparatuses in ancient China when 
independent states under the nominal dominance of the Eastern Zhou dynasty 
(770–256 BCE) strove to annex each other and usurp the authority of the Zhou 
kings. With the unification of China under the Qin dynasty in 221 BCE and 
critical revisions of the imperial system carried out by the succeeding Han 
dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), China came to be “the first civilization to invent 
the modern state” (p. 78). (Intellectually uneasy about this claim, I will return 
to it in the third section.) Yet as the formation the Chinese state was driven 
solely by war, other key institutions and societal forces were not in place to 
check sovereign power. Hence, imperial China was cyclically plagued by bad 
emperors who abused their centralized power or failed to exert it at all, 
personally contributing to political decay.
 In part 2 of the book, “State Building,” Fukuyama discusses India and 
the Islamic world along with China. Indian history presents a sharp contrast 
to Chinese political development. On the one hand, the frequency of warfare 
characterizing pre-Qin China found no counterpart in ancient India, which 
accordingly was not incentivized to make a strong, centralized state. On the 
other hand, Hinduism provided Indian society with a sense of providence, a 
sense that laws are more elevated than secular decrees, which thus formed a 
rudimentary framework for the rule of law. However, Hindu’s introduction of 
the rigid caste systems of varna and jati virtually frustrated any attempts to 
bring the whole subcontinent under a powerful regime, with the result that 
India suffered repeated external invasions and rule by foreign powers. Even 
to the present day, Indian democracy still lacks a state with the ability to 
exert authoritarian power.
 The Islamic world constitutes another major reference for comparison 
with the West. As faith was the binding force for political cohesion in the 
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Islamic world, the rule of law was not absent, at least theoretically, in the 
Islamic political tradition. To prevent kinship influence in states, there 
emerged in successive Islamic regimes a system of cultivating slave civilian 
and military staff, who were cut from their families and native cultures and 
educated in an elitist style to furnish states with outstanding bureaucrats and 
soldiers. The system, called Mamluk, was strictly nonhereditary at the begin-
ning, but the biological nature of human beings made such rule unsustainable, 
and there were no effective social forces to hold the increasingly entrenched 
upper classes of such states accountable. Hence, the decline of this peculiar 
recruitment system led to the decline of Islamic empires. From China to the 
Islamic world, Fukuyama accumulates sufficient examples to argue for the 
importance of the coexistence of the three institutions—the state, the rule of 
law, and accountable government—which Western Europe came to possess in 
the course of modern history.
 Parts 3 and 4 of the book, “The Rule of Law” and “Accountable 
Government,” are dedicated mainly to the rise of these two key institutions 
and their coming together in the West. The Catholic Church played a signifi-
cant role in preserving a social space exempt from excessive state interven-
tion. With its hierarchical structure and well-defined clerical and lay func-
tions, the Catholic Church also provided a model of the rule of law for 
emerging European states to emulate. In contrast, the Orthodox Church of the 
Byzantine Empire never evolved out of a caesaropapist type of authoritari-
anism in which the law was invariably subjugated to the state. Further 
comparison reveals that while traditional China never saw the emergence of a 
rule of law, with such moral notions as the Heavenly Mandate being the sole 
check on imperial power, Indian rule of law existed only in primitive forms, 
and the rule of law in the Islamic world was more symbolic than real.
 In presenting the formation of accountable government, Fukuyama breaks 
the topic into the British, French/Spanish, Hungarian, and Russian cases, 
explaining how the different configurations of political actors decided 
governmental accountability and thus stability of individual political systems. 
“The amount of resistance to state centralization depended on the degree to 
which the three groups outside the state—nobility, gentry, and Third Estate 
[consisting of tradesmen, merchants, free serfs, and other town and city 
dwellers]—were able to work together to resist royal power. It also depended 
on the internal cohesion that each one demonstrated. And finally, it depended 
on the cohesion and sense of purpose of the state itself” (p. 333). In addition, 
despite their great number, peasants were historically too scattered to form 
any durable political bodies to claim self-interests. While it is impossible to 
wade into the historical details of the aforementioned cases, only in England 
did the balance of power help the country to thrive, and the superiority of its 
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institutions became all the more conspicuous after the Industrial Revolution. 
In France, political forces other than the state were too fragmented to resist 
being co-opted by the latter. This political collusion placed an unbearable 
burden on the peasantry—a predicament eradicated only through the French 
Revolution. In Hungary, nobility and gentry formed a strong coalition that 
paralyzed the state and accelerated its demise. In Russia, all political forces 
were rigorously subjugated to the state in a perfect absolutism.
III
 Fukuyama deals with so many Western countries to avoid the pitfall of 
Whig history, which entertains the progressive view that the Western political 
tradition arose in Greek and Roman times, was codified in the Magna Carta, 
then was firmly established by the Glorious Revolution, and with the expan-
sion of the British Empire, was spread to the rest of the world. Instead of this 
view, Fukuyama insists that British political success arose contingently. None 
of its liberal tradition, concentration of social forces through feudalism, or 
widespread practice of customary laws was predestined. Nevertheless, it can 
easily be observed that Fukuyama’s theory of political order is approaching an 
end not unlike that of the Whig view: the British political system at its prime 
speaks for its own legitimacy; it hardly needs further justification. For 
Fukuyama, the well-balanced political mechanism that happened to mature in 
the West, especially in England—that is, the interdependent yet mutually 
autonomous institutions of the state, the rule of law, and accountable govern-
ment—guarantees a sustainable political order. Indeed, in part 5 of the book, 
“Toward a Theory of Political Development,” different combinations of the 
three institutions are examined to explain the success or failure of various 
regimes worldwide.
 Obviously, Fukuyama’s account is deeply rooted in international 
anarchy—the notion that the state is not only the unit of political action but 
also the end of political development. Of course, Fukuyama’s realist theory 
construction is admirable, whose state-centric perspective relies heavily on 
reference to biology, which tells us that the tendency toward violence and 
competition is no less embedded in human nature than the tendency toward 
cooperation. Nonetheless, his deliberate detachment from Western centrism 
cannot be fully successful if modern Western institutions—rather young in 
human history without having sufficiently stood the test of time—are 
enthroned as the ultimate form of human political organization. (Fukuyama 
does not make this claim, of course, but his theory, while allowing reconfigu-
ration, allows for no improvement of the key institutions.) Furthermore, resort 
to biology also obliges Fukuyama to compare biological and political evolu-
tion (pp. 446–449)—a project that would benefit from greater nuance and 
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more historical insights.
 Thus, in a sense, this book is more typological than historical. It can be 
claimed to be historical in its delineation of the political development of each 
selected tradition. Yet throughout the book that historical account is spun 
around crystallized notions of the state, the rule of law, and accountable 
government, and shortcomings of their development in different regions are 
indicated with purposeful comparison with their later maturation and even 
consummation in the West. More important, Fukuyama deals with each tradi-
tion mainly in isolation, although he is aware that intensive interaction and 
mutual influence occurred between civilizations. In his rather fragmentary 
treatment, however, he frequently and freely draws analogies between situa-
tions in different contexts, a method that calls for extreme caution in histor-
ical studies, and he often directs such analogies at the differences between 
Western and non-Western political developments.
 Under this circumstance, the claim that China had the first organized state 
hardly amounts to anything more than a slogan that, paradoxically, betrays the 
difficulty of departing from Western centrism. Fukuyama claims, “China was 
the first civilization to invent the modern state” (my italics). This obviously 
achronological statement can only be understood in a typological rather than 
historical sense. That is, the modern state can find a prototype in ancient 
China (not an origin in a strict sense, as a historical relationship has not been 
established). Likewise, India and the Islamic world are drawn into the narra-
tive with the same typological logic: the historical intricacies of these civili-
zations being largely omitted in favor of the modern West as the centerpiece 
of comparative political development. Besides, some historical actualities 
presented in the book need reconsideration. For example, Fukuyama oversim-
plifies in portraying Empress Wu (Wu Zetian, 623–705) of China as purely 
evil, and he is not precise in describing modern China (prior to World War II) 
as a colony.
 Not surprisingly, perhaps, Fukuyama classifies civilizations—China, India, 
the Islamic world, Russia as approaching the West, and Latin America as 
derived from the West—in a style similar to that of Samuel Huntington in 
The Clash of Civilizations. While such classification is not intrinsically wrong, 
this treatment is problematic in at least two aspects. First, minor traditions are 
simply invisible in this picture. Second, the diversity only of the West 
receives Fukuyama’s attention, with the inner variations of other civilizations 
being ignored. Indeed, any comparative work of such a vast temporal and 
spatial scope will bog down if too many historical details are required, but a 
more balanced treatment of civilizations is certainly desirable.
 Fukuyama makes an interesting observation: “One of dynastic China’s 
great legacies, then, is high-quality authoritarian government. It is no accident 
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that virtually all of the world’s successful authoritarian modernizers, including 
South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and modern China itself, are East Asian 
countries sharing a common Chinese cultural heritage” (p. 313). Following 
this clue, one may be prompted to ask, given that the state, the rule of law, 
and accountable government are cornerstone institutions, can countries with 
different traditions achieve a good political order with different proportions of 
these institutions, or is there a golden ratio that they have to approximate, as 
exemplified by certain Western paradigm countries?
 Finally, it is reasonable to ask whether the state, the rule of law, and 
accountable government furnish all that is necessary for a good political 
order. Based on human biology, which features both reciprocal cooperation 
and violent competition, Fukuyama’s ideal political world is characterized by 
a balance of institutional powers. Ideas are extremely important in making 
political systems, as he fully admits. How can cultural, ideological, psycho-
logical, and moral factors help to define, refine, or even transcend this mech-
anism of mutual checks? This is an issue worthy of more in-depth study.
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 The historiography of Asian connections through the study of pre-colonial 
and early modern maritime trade is longstanding, but academic interest in 
Asian connections of the modern period is recent. In Prasenjit Duara’s words, 
this new interest is “unable to grasp the continuities and discontinuities that 
form the present.” 1
 1 Prasenjit Duara, “Asia Redux: Conceptualizing a Region for Our Times,” The 
Journal of Asian Studies 69, 4 (2010): 963.
